smithery/vinnie357

security-stride-methodology

Activate when conducting security analysis using STRIDE threat modeling, vulnerability assessment, and security architecture evaluation

Installation

$ npx skills add smithery/vinnie357 --skill security-stride-methodology

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More details

Agent compatibility

Declared targets from SKILL.md / docs. Unmarked agents are not listed — the skill may still install via the CLI.

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Skill metadata

Parsed from SKILL.md frontmatter.

LicenseMIT

Package contents

Files included with this skill beyond the listing page.

  • skill md SKILL.md 4,620 B
  • docs SUMMARY.md 170 B

History

  1. First recorded snapshot · 0 installs

SKILL.md

STRIDE Security Methodology

Guide for comprehensive security analysis using the STRIDE threat modeling framework, vulnerability assessment, and security architecture evaluation.

When to Use This Skill

Activate when:

  • Conducting security threat modeling
  • Performing vulnerability assessments
  • Evaluating security architecture
  • Creating security review documentation
  • Generating threat model diagrams
  • Assessing security posture of applications

STRIDE Framework

STRIDE categorizes security threats into six categories:

S - Spoofing

Identity theft/impersonation threats

  • User authentication bypass
  • Session hijacking
  • Credential theft
  • Certificate spoofing

T - Tampering

Data modification threats

  • SQL injection
  • Parameter manipulation
  • Man-in-the-middle attacks
  • Data store manipulation

R - Repudiation

Deniability threats

  • Log tampering
  • Missing audit trails
  • Insufficient logging
  • Non-repudiation failures

I - Information Disclosure

Data exposure threats

  • Sensitive data leakage
  • Error message exposure
  • Directory traversal
  • Improper access controls

D - Denial of Service

Availability threats

  • Resource exhaustion
  • Rate limiting bypass
  • Memory leaks
  • Infinite loops

E - Elevation of Privilege

Authorization bypass threats

  • Privilege escalation
  • Role bypass
  • Insecure direct object reference
  • Broken access control

Security Analysis Process

Phase 1: Asset Identification

  1. Identify critical data assets
  2. Map data flows and trust boundaries
  3. Identify entry points and exit points
  4. Document authentication mechanisms
  5. List third-party dependencies

Phase 2: Threat Modeling

  1. Apply STRIDE to each component
  2. Identify threat scenarios
  3. Assess likelihood and impact
  4. Document attack vectors
  5. Create threat diagrams

Phase 3: Vulnerability Assessment

  1. Static code analysis
  2. Dependency vulnerability scanning
  3. Configuration review
  4. Authentication/authorization testing
  5. Input validation analysis

Phase 4: Risk Prioritization

  1. Calculate risk scores
  2. Prioritize by business impact
  3. Identify quick wins
  4. Create remediation roadmap
  5. Document mitigations

Threat Model Template

## Threat: [STRIDE Category] - [Threat Name]

### Description
[Detailed threat description]

### Attack Vector
[How the attack could be executed]

### Affected Components
- [Component 1]
- [Component 2]

### Risk Assessment
- **Likelihood**: High/Medium/Low
- **Impact**: High/Medium/Low
- **Risk Score**: [Likelihood × Impact]

### Mitigation
- [Mitigation step 1]
- [Mitigation step 2]

### Verification
- [How to verify mitigation is effective]

Mermaid Diagram Patterns

Data Flow Diagram

graph LR
    A[User] -->|HTTPS| B[Load Balancer]
    B -->|Internal| C[App Server]
    C -->|Query| D[(Database)]
    C -->|API| E[External Service]

    style B fill:#f9f,stroke:#333
    style D fill:#bbf,stroke:#333

Trust Boundary Diagram

graph TB
    subgraph "Untrusted Zone"
        A[Internet Users]
    end

    subgraph "DMZ"
        B[Web Server]
    end

    subgraph "Trusted Zone"
        C[App Server]
        D[(Database)]
    end

    A --> B
    B --> C
    C --> D

Security Report Structure

# Security Assessment Report

## Executive Summary
- **Overall Risk Level**: [Critical/High/Medium/Low]
- **Critical Issues**: [Count]
- **High Issues**: [Count]
- **Recommendations**: [Top 3 actions]

## Threat Model Analysis
### STRIDE Coverage
- Spoofing: [Finding count]
- Tampering: [Finding count]
- Repudiation: [Finding count]
- Information Disclosure: [Finding count]
- Denial of Service: [Finding count]
- Elevation of Privilege: [Finding count]

## Architecture Diagram
[Mermaid diagram with trust boundaries]

## Findings

### Critical
1. [Finding with STRIDE category]

### High Priority
1. [Finding with STRIDE category]

## Remediation Roadmap
### Immediate (0-7 days)
- [Action items]

### Short-term (1-4 weeks)
- [Action items]

### Long-term (1-3 months)
- [Action items]

Key Principles

  • Defense in Depth: Multiple security layers
  • Least Privilege: Minimal access rights
  • Secure by Default: Safe default configurations
  • Fail Securely: Handle errors safely
  • Zero Trust: Verify everything, trust nothing
  • Data Classification: Protect based on sensitivity