smithery/gl0bal01

malware-triage

Rapid static assessment, classification, and prioritization of malware samples.

Installation

$ npx skills add smithery/gl0bal01 --skill malware-triage

Summary

  • Rapid static assessment, classification, and prioritization of malware samples.
  • Use for the first look at any unknown file — hashes, file type, packing, imports, strings, initial IOCs, threat level, and the decision on which deep-analysis phase comes next.
  • Claude runs the static tooling on the host itself; the sample is never executed.

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More details

Agent compatibility

Declared targets from SKILL.md / docs. Unmarked agents are not listed — the skill may still install via the CLI.

Claude Code Not declared
Cursor Not declared
Codex Not declared
GitHub Copilot Not declared
Windsurf Not declared
Gemini CLI Not declared
Cline Not declared
OpenCode Not declared

Package contents

Files included with this skill beyond the listing page.

  • skill md SKILL.md 13,726 B
  • docs SUMMARY.md 354 B

History

  1. First recorded snapshot · 0 installs

SKILL.md

Malware Triage

First phase for every sample. You run static tools on the host, interpret the output, classify the sample, and decide the next phase. Target: 5-15 minutes per sample.

Execution Model

  • You run the commands. You have Bash. Execute every command in this skill yourself and interpret the output. Do not ask the user to run tools or paste results unless a tool is missing and cannot be installed.
  • Locate skill files. Scripts and reference files ship in this skill's directory. Set R="${CLAUDEPLUGINROOT:-<dir containing this SKILL.md>}" once (when installed as a plugin $CLAUDEPLUGINROOT is set; otherwise it is this skill folder). Your working directory is the user's analysis workspace, so prefix every script path below with $R, e.g. python3 "$R"/scripts/ioc_extract.py.
  • Never execute the sample. Only static tools touch it: file, strings, pe_info.py, upx -d, 7z l, hashing. No chmod +x, no wine, no ./sample.
  • Never upload the sample to any service without explicit consent. Hash lookups are fine; file uploads are not.
  • Script paths are relative to this skill directory. From the repo/skill root: malware-triage/scripts/peinfo.py, malware-triage/scripts/hashcalculator.py, scripts/ioc_extract.py. Resolve them from wherever this SKILL.md lives.
  • Tool check first. Run once per session; note what is missing and degrade rather than stop:

``bash command -v file strings upx 7z yara; python3 -c "import pefile" 2>&1 | tail -1 # pefile missing -> pip install pefile (needed by pe_info.py) ``

  • Big outputs: never cat a strings dump. Save to a file, wc -l, then grep/head.
  • Ask the user only for: the sample path, context (where it came from, incident ID, anything already known), and reputation results if no MCP server is available.

Workflow

Step 1 — Identify and hash

S=/path/to/sample
file "$S"; ls -l "$S"
python3 malware-triage/scripts/hash_calculator.py "$S"

Record MD5/SHA1/SHA256, size, file output. Then route on the file output:

file says Action
Mono/.Net assembly Record hashes, hand back to orchestrator → specialized-file-analyzer (check this before PE)
Microsoft Office, PDF document, ELF, MS Windows shortcut, Zip/RAR/7-zip, ISO 9660, Microsoft Disk Image, HTML document, script/text Record hashes, hand back to orchestrator → specialized-file-analyzer
PE32 / PE32+ (not .NET) Continue below
data / unrecognized Continue at Unknown Files

Step 2 — Reputation

  • MCP available (VirusTotal, Threat Intel / MalwareBazaar): look up the SHA256. Record detection ratio, family labels, first-seen date, tags. Look up any imphash and section hashes too.
  • No MCP: give the user the SHA256 and ask them to check VirusTotal / MalwareBazaar while you continue. Do not block on it. Zero detections on a fresh hash means nothing; 0 detections on an old hash is informative.
  • Reputation is a hint, not the verdict. Static findings override AV labels.

Step 3 — PE static summary

python3 malware-triage/scripts/pe_info.py "$S"          # add --json for structured output

Read every section of the output. What matters:

Output Interpretation
.NET: YES Stop, route to specialized-file-analyzer
Compile timestamp in the future / before 2000 Forged; ignore for dating. Rich header linker info is harder to fake
Overall entropy > 7.0, or executable section > 6.8, or ! markers Packed/encrypted — see Packed Samples
Entry point outside .text/CODE, or in last section Packer stub or appended code
Import count < 10, or only LoadLibrary/GetProcAddress/VirtualAlloc Runtime API resolution — packed or deliberately hiding imports
Suspicious import categories (injection, keylogging, network, anti-debug, crypto, persistence) Map each to a capability; cross-check with references/indicators.md
Overlay present Appended data: config, second-stage payload, or installer archive. Carve it: python3 -c "..." using the reported offset, then file the result
Signature present Verify claimed signer; revoked/self-signed/mismatched = red flag. Unsigned is neutral
PDB path Project/user names, build environment — high-value attribution string
Resources with high entropy or large size Embedded payload. Note type/size; extract in deep analysis
TLS callbacks Code runs before entry point — anti-debug or early unpacking
Version info mimicking Microsoft/Adobe/etc. while unsigned Masquerading

Step 4 — Strings and IOCs

W=triage_$(basename "$S")   # work dir
mkdir -p "$W"
strings -a -n 6 "$S"      > "$W/strings_ascii.txt"
strings -a -n 6 -e l "$S" > "$W/strings_wide.txt"      # UTF-16LE, essential for Windows binaries
wc -l "$W"/strings_*.txt
python3 scripts/ioc_extract.py "$W"/strings_*.txt         # defanged IPs, domains, URLs, emails, hashes, reg keys, paths

Then targeted greps (adjust after reading the ioc_extract output):

grep -ihE 'HKEY_|HKLM|HKCU|CurrentVersion\\Run|schtasks|sc create|netsh|vssadmin|bcdedit|wmic' "$W"/strings_*.txt | sort -u | head -40
grep -ihE 'user-agent|mozilla/|POST |GET |Content-Type|\.php|\.onion|/gate|/panel' "$W"/strings_*.txt | sort -u | head -40
grep -ihE 'mutex|Global\\|Local\\|\\pipe\\' "$W"/strings_*.txt | sort -u | head -20
grep -ihE 'IsDebuggerPresent|VMware|VBox|vbox|QEMU|Xen|sandbox|SbieDll|wireshark|procmon|ollydbg|x64dbg' "$W"/strings_*.txt | sort -u
grep -ihE 'bitcoin|monero|\.onion|decrypt|ransom|your files|README' "$W"/strings_*.txt | sort -u | head -20
grep -ihE '\.exe|\.dll|\.bat|\.ps1|\.vbs|\.tmp' "$W"/strings_*.txt | grep -viE 'kernel32|ntdll|user32|advapi32|msvcr|api-ms-win' | sort -u | head -40

Note what is absent too: a binary with network imports but no URL/IP strings is decrypting its config at runtime.

Suspicious-API and string categories: references/indicators.md.

Packed Samples

Triggered by Step 3 entropy/import findings.

Packer Indicators Unpack on host?
UPX UPX0/UPX1 sections, UPX! in overlay Yes: upx -d "$S" -o "$W/unpacked.exe"
Themida / WinLicense .themida, .winlicense sections, huge protected section No — dynamic analysis
VMProtect .vmp0/.vmp1 No — dynamic analysis
ASPack / MPRESS / Petite / Enigma / Upack named sections (.aspack, .MPRESS1, .petite, .enigma1, .Upack) Rarely — dynamic analysis
Custom / unknown high entropy, few imports, no known section names No — dynamic analysis

If UPX unpacking succeeds: hash the unpacked file, re-run Steps 3-4 on it, record both hashes (packed = delivery artifact, unpacked = what matches families). If upx -d fails, the UPX header was tampered; treat as custom.

Set sophistication: known packer → at least Moderate; commercial protector → Advanced; custom packer → Advanced/APT. Add "requires dynamic analysis to reveal imports/strings" to next steps.

Step 5 — Classify

Combine imports, strings, reputation, and context. Consult references/indicators.md for the patterns.

Type Typical evidence
Trojan / RAT / Backdoor socket or WinHTTP + command dispatch strings, screen/keyboard APIs, persistence
Ransomware Crypt* APIs, file enumeration, vssadmin delete shadows, ransom-note strings, wallet addresses
Infostealer browser profile paths (Login Data, cookies.sqlite), wallet dirs, CryptUnprotectData, exfil URL
Dropper / Loader small binary, high-entropy resource or overlay, URLDownloadToFile, WriteFile + CreateProcess, few other capabilities
Cryptominer pool URLs (stratum+tcp://), xmrig, high CPU-related config strings
Worm SMB/RPC APIs, network share enumeration, removable-drive checks

Threat level: Critical (destructive, ransomware, APT) / High (data theft, full compromise) / Medium (limited capability, targeted) / Low (adware, PUP, commodity). Sophistication: Simple / Moderate / Advanced / APT-level, driven by protection, evasion, and custom code. Verdict: Malicious / Suspicious / Benign. Benign requires positive evidence (valid signature from a plausible vendor, expected imports for its stated purpose, reputation clean over time), not just absence of red flags.

Step 6 — Predict behavior

Turn static evidence into a watch list for the dynamic phase. Each prediction names the evidence:

  • Process: child processes or injection expected? Which targets (CreateRemoteThread + OpenProcess → injection; CreateProcess + cmd/powershell strings → LOLBin chain)?
  • Files: paths from strings; temp/AppData drops if GetTempPath/SHGetFolderPath imported.
  • Registry: Run keys, service creation, IFEO from strings/imports.
  • Network: protocol (WinHTTP/WinINet → HTTP(S); socket/connect → raw TCP; DnsQuery only → DNS tunnelling/DGA), hard-coded C2 vs runtime-decrypted, likely beacon.
  • Persistence: mechanism and location.
  • Evasion: anti-VM/anti-debug strings → plan for bypass (malware-dynamic-analysis/references/antianalysisbypass.md).

These predictions become the Procmon/Sysmon filters and the observation plan for malware-dynamic-analysis.

Step 7 — Priority and next phase

Priority When
Immediate Unknown/undetected, incident-related, destructive capability, APT indicators, matches current threat intel
Standard Known family variant, commodity malware with existing coverage
Low Well-documented sample, adware/PUP, old, likely false positive

Next phase: malware-dynamic-analysis for PE files that are packed, have runtime-resolved config, or need behavioral confirmation; detection-engineer + malware-report-writer directly when the sample is a known variant and static IOCs suffice; Benign closes the sample.

Unknown Files

file returned data or something unhelpful:

xxd "$S" | head -20                      # magic bytes, structure
strings -a -n 8 "$S" | head -50
python3 - "$S" <<'EOF'                   # single-byte XOR brute force for a hidden PE
import sys; b=open(sys.argv[1],'rb').read()
for k in range(1,256):
    d=bytes(x^k for x in b[:4096])
    if d[:2]==b'MZ' or b'This program cannot' in d: print(f"XOR key 0x{k:02x} reveals PE header")
EOF

Also check: base64 blob ([A-Za-z0-9+/]{100,}), gzip/zlib magic (1f 8b, 78 9c), reversed PE (ZM at end), shellcode (starts with fc e8 / e8 00 00 00 00 / 55 8b ec). Decode what you find, file the result, and re-route.

Batch Triage

For N samples, do a quick pass on all before deep-diving any:

for f in samples/*; do
  echo "== $f"; file "$f"; sha256sum "$f"
  python3 malware-triage/scripts/pe_info.py "$f" 2>/dev/null | grep -E '^\.NET:|packed|imported functions' 
done

Produce a ranking table (sample, type, packed, detections, priority, one-line reason), then run the full workflow on Immediate samples first.

Output

  1. Print the triage report (template below, filled in — no placeholders left).
  2. Append to analysis_state.md in the user's working directory using the orchestrator's structure: hashes, type, priority, classification, threat level, triage findings, IOCs (defanged), next-phase recommendation.
  3. Recommend the next phase with reasoning, then wait for the user.
## Triage Report — [filename]

**Hashes:** MD5 … / SHA1 … / SHA256 …   **Size:** … bytes   **Type:** …   **Packed:** No | Yes (packer)
**Reputation:** VT x/y, family label(s), first seen … | not checked

### Static Findings
- Compile time / linker / signature / PDB
- Sections + entropy (flag anomalies)
- Suspicious imports by category → capability
- Notable strings: URLs, IPs, paths, registry, mutex, UA, commands
- Resources / overlay / TLS callbacks

### Classification
**Verdict:** Malicious | Suspicious | Benign   **Type:** …   **Threat:** Critical | High | Medium | Low   **Sophistication:** …
**Capabilities:** …

### Predicted Behavior
Process / Files / Registry / Network / Persistence / Evasion — each with the evidence behind it

### Initial IOCs (defanged)
File: hashes, imphash, dropped names · Network: … · Host: registry, paths, mutex

### Recommendation
**Priority:** …   **Next phase:** …   **Why:** …

Quality Gate

Before handing back: all three hashes; file type; packing status with evidence; imports categorized; strings run in both ASCII and UTF-16; IOCs extracted and defanged; classification with reasoning; predictions tied to evidence; state file updated.

References

  • references/indicators.md — suspicious API imports, string patterns, behavioral indicators, packer signatures, classification patterns
  • references/triage_checklist.md — full checklist, decision tree, dynamic go/no-go criteria, tool reference
  • scripts/pe_info.py — PE header/section/import/resource/overlay/signature summary (needs pefile)
  • scripts/hash_calculator.py — MD5/SHA1/SHA256
  • ../scripts/ioc_extract.py — IOC extraction and defanging from any text