redis/agent-skills · Official

redis-security

Redis security guidance covering authentication (requirepass and ACL users), TLS, ACL-based least-privilege access control, restricting network exposure via bind and protected-mode, firewall rules, and disabling dangerous commands.

All-time #6940 Trending #5104 Hot #2539 First seen May 26, 2026
8-week activity · all time api

Installation

$ npx skills add redis/agent-skills --skill redis-security

Summary

  • Redis security guidance covering authentication (requirepass and ACL users), TLS, ACL-based least-privilege access control, restricting network exposure via bind and protected-mode, firewall rules, and disabling dangerous commands.
  • Use when deploying Redis to production, defining ACL users for an application, configuring TLS connections, locking down a Redis instance behind a firewall, or auditing a Redis deployment for security hardening.

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More details

Agent compatibility

Declared targets from SKILL.md / docs. Unmarked agents are not listed — the skill may still install via the CLI.

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Repository health

Stars 143
License LICENSE
Default branch main
Open issues 4
Status Active

Skill metadata

Parsed from SKILL.md frontmatter.

Version0.1.0
LicenseMIT
More metadata
author
Redis, Inc.
version
0.1.0

Package contents

Files included with this skill beyond the listing page.

  • skill md SKILL.md 3,683 B
  • docs SUMMARY.md 462 B

History

  1. First seen on skills.sh
  2. First recorded snapshot · 1,719 installs

SKILL.md

Redis Security

Production hardening for Redis: authentication, ACL-based access control, and network exposure. Cover all three together — any one of them on its own leaves an exploitable gap.

When to apply

  • Deploying or reviewing a Redis instance destined for production.
  • Setting up application credentials beyond a shared password.
  • Auditing a Redis deployment against a security checklist.
  • Receiving "Redis exposed to the internet" findings from a scanner.

1. Always authenticate (and use TLS)

Never run a production Redis without a password. Pair authentication with TLS so credentials and data aren't sent in clear text.

# redis.conf
requirepass your-strong-password
tls-port 6380
tls-cert-file /path/to/redis.crt
tls-key-file  /path/to/redis.key
r = redis.Redis(
    host="localhost",
    port=6380,
    password="your-strong-password",
    ssl=True,
    ssl_cert_reqs="required",
)

If you can use ACL users (next section) instead of the single requirepass, do — requirepass is effectively the legacy "default user" shortcut.

See [references/auth.md](references/auth.md).

2. ACLs for least-privilege access

The default user with a shared password is fine for development. For production, give each application a dedicated ACL user with only the commands and key patterns it actually needs.

# Cache-only reader
ACL SETUSER app_readonly on >password ~cache:* +get +mget +scan

# Writer that can't run dangerous ops
ACL SETUSER app_writer   on >password ~*        +@all -@dangerous

# Admin (use sparingly, never for application traffic)
ACL SETUSER admin        on >strong-password ~* +@all

Useful command categories:

Category What it covers
@read Read commands (GET, MGET, HGET, ...)
@write Write commands (SET, DEL, XADD, ...)
@dangerous FLUSHALL, DEBUG, KEYS, etc.
@admin Administrative commands

If app credentials leak, a tight ACL bounds the blast radius — the attacker can't FLUSHALL your DB just because they grabbed a cache reader's password.

See [references/acls.md](references/acls.md).

3. Restrict network access

The most common Redis breach is a public-internet Redis with no auth. Avoid that with three layers:

# redis.conf — bind to specific interfaces, keep protected-mode on
bind 127.0.0.1 192.168.1.100
protected-mode yes
# Firewall — allow only application subnets
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 6379 -s 192.168.1.0/24 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 6379 -j DROP

Anti-pattern: bind 0.0.0.0 + protected-mode no — exposes Redis to the whole network without protection.

Optional but recommended: rename or disable destructive commands so a compromised client can't trash the DB:

rename-command FLUSHALL ""
rename-command DEBUG ""
rename-command CONFIG ""

See [references/network.md](references/network.md).

References