STRK20 Privacy SDK: wallets and key-holding backends
The low-level route for teams building the wallet itself, or backends that manage their own account, viewing key, note discovery, and proving. If you are building a dapp on top of existing wallets, stop here and use strk20-wallet-api, which keeps viewing keys inside the wallet.
The SDK is TypeScript. A Python or Rust backend that wants STRK20 runs a Node (>= 24) sidecar service around it (per the official agent-skill repo). Full doc pages sit in references/.
Install
npm install @starkware-libs/starknet-privacy-sdk
Node.js >= 24 required (ohttp-ts needs modern WebCrypto). If npm returns 404 (a known temporary issue while Starkware restores its npm org), install from GitHub Packages, which needs a GitHub token even for public packages:
gh auth refresh -h github.com -s read:packages
export NODE_AUTH_TOKEN="$(gh auth token)"
npm config set @starkware-libs:registry https://npm.pkg.github.com --location=project
npm config set '//npm.pkg.github.com/:_authToken' '${NODE_AUTH_TOKEN}' --location=project
npm install @starkware-libs/starknet-privacy-sdk
unset NODE_AUTH_TOKEN
The project .npmrc stores an environment-variable placeholder, not the token. Do not replace it with token text or commit a file containing credentials. Or pin a commit: npm install "starkware-libs/starknet-privacy#<commit-sha>". The monorepo's sdk/README.md covers what the docs pages don't: transaction sequencing against finalized state, the Open note API, pre_confirmed reads, and classifyTransaction for history. A copy sits in references/starknet-privacy-sdk-README.md.
Wiring
import { Account, RpcProvider, constants } from "starknet"
import { createPrivateTransfers } from "@starkware-libs/starknet-privacy-sdk"
const provider = new RpcProvider({ nodeUrl: process.env.RPC_URL! })
const account = new Account({
provider,
address: process.env.ACCOUNT_ADDRESS!,
signer: process.env.ACCOUNT_PRIVATE_KEY!,
cairoVersion: "1", // required for accounts sending v3 transactions
})
const transfers = createPrivateTransfers({
account,
// MUST be a bigint. A hex string silently derives wrong channel keys,
// and notes sent to you will never decrypt.
viewingKeyProvider: { getViewingKey: async () => BigInt(process.env.VIEWING_KEY!) },
provingProvider: { url: process.env.PROVING_SERVICE_URL!, chainId: constants.StarknetChainId.SN_SEPOLIA },
discoveryProvider: { url: process.env.INDEXER_URL! },
poolContractAddress: process.env.POOL_ADDRESS!,
})
Sepolia pool (v2.0): 0x0254a6b2997ef52e9f830ce1f543f6b29768295e8d17e2267d672c552cfe0d91. Viewing key range: [1, MAXVIEWINGKEY] (half the STARK curve order, exported by the SDK). Keys and secrets stay in env vars, never in files.
The submission tail (identical for every operation)
// Prove against an older block. Inputs and prior transparent state must
// already exist at this base, and proving at the chain head risks reorgs.
const provingBlockId = (await provider.getBlockNumber()) - 10
const { callAndProof } = await transfers.build()/* ...ops... */.execute({ provingBlockId })
// Omit proof keys entirely when there are no proof facts. Passing
// empty arrays serializes an invalid v3 transaction.
const proofDetails = callAndProof.proof.proofFacts?.length
? { proofFacts: callAndProof.proof.proofFacts, proof: callAndProof.proof.data }
: {}
// tip is mandatory for v3 transactions in starknet.js
const tx = await account.execute(callAndProof.call, { tip: 0n, ...proofDetails })
await provider.waitForTransaction(tx.transaction_hash)
Always pass provingBlockId = currentBlock - 10. It buffers L2 reorgs (the contract accepts proofs up to proofvalidityblocks old, default 450 ≈ 15 min, governance-set) and keeps discovery and proving on the same state. The chosen base must already include every note and transparent state change the proof reads. Re-fetch it after every waitForTransaction when chaining transactions.
The transparent-state rule (per the SDK README): any onchain state the pool proof reads, including the account's viewing key, depositor token balance, and nullifier set, must exist at the chosen proof base. With provingBlockId = head - 10, poll until head - 10 > receiptBlock for each prior state-changing transaction. The prover reads finalized state, never pre_confirmed. Concretely:
register() fails right after the account's deploy-account transaction.
Wait until the chosen base is later than the deploy receipt block.
deposit() fails when the chosen base predates the ERC-20 funding transfer.
Wait until the base is later than the funding receipt block, then rebuild.
- A prior private transaction's block must be included in the finalized base
before you can prove the next transaction against its notes.
The bundled sdk__deposit.md snapshot incorrectly says the approval must be visible at the proving base and cannot share a transaction with the deposit. An upstream correction is pending. Treat that page's two-transaction rule as stale and follow the route-specific guidance below.
Operations map
- register(): once per account per pool deployment. It publishes the
public viewing key and stores the auditor-encrypted private key. Registering twice reverts. build({ autoRegister: true }) bundles registration into any first operation and no-ops if already registered.
- deposit: the pool pulls with
transfer_from, so it needs an ERC-20
approve from the token owner. The documented plain-SDK example submits approval first as its own transaction, but that is example sequencing, not a protocol constraint. A user-account multicall can place approval before applyactions. Under a paymaster, approval rides the user's signed outside execution in invokeandapplyaction, in the same transaction as the deposit. Then .with(token, t => t.deposit({ amount })) with surplusTo(me). autoSetup: true opens the self-channel and token subchannel a first deposit needs.
- transfer:
.inputs(note) picks notes, or autoSelectNotes: "naive"
(smallest covering set) or "all" (consolidation). surplusTo(...) is REQUIRED whenever inputs may exceed outputs, else execute() throws "no surplus recipient". Change notes mature 10 blocks before reuse.
- deposit + transfer: compose in one
.with() block. Omit recipient on
the deposit and let surplusTo take the remainder. Same-transaction consumption of the deposit needs no maturity wait.
- withdraw: the exit door.
recipient is a public address, so paying a
merchant straight from the pool is one withdraw. Token, amount, and recipient become public. Which notes funded it stays hidden. Check ExecuteResult.warnings for USER_LINKAGE before submitting.
- multi-op / multi-token: chain ops per
.with() and repeat .with()
per token. Per-token balance sheets, one atomic transaction, at most one invoke() per transaction. Very large recipient lists can hit proof-size limits, so fall back to per-recipient transactions, waiting out change-note maturity between them.
- shadow accounts, called sub-accounts in RC.4: SDK
0.14.3-rc.6 uses
transfers.build().shadowAccounts(dappName).invoke(nonce, ...), the shadowAccountAnonymizerAddress config field, and the shadowaccountanonymizer Cairo package. The account is deterministic for (user, dappName, nonce). Increment the nonce for a fresh account. Reusing it reuses the same public account and links its activity. The account hides the direct main-wallet link, not its calls, balances, positions, events, or timing. Read references/shadow-accounts.md before designing this route. RC.5 renamed the views and deployment event, which changed their selectors and keys. It requires the upgraded anonymizer. Indexers reading across the upgrade must match both the historical SubAccountDeployed and current ShadowAccountDeployed keys. Treat this release candidate as an API for teams that control their own accounts and can confirm its current audit and deployment status.
Setup requirements before transferring
transfers.discoverRequirement(recipientHex, BigInt(token)) returns Register (a hard stop, only the recipient can publish their viewing key), SetupChannel (fix: builder.setup(recipient)), SetupToken (fix: t.setup(recipient) inside the token block), or Ready. The caller must itself be registered or it throws with an unhelpful message. Match on "not registered" or "viewing key" substrings to distinguish it from RPC errors. autoSetup is fine for single-recipient flows. For batches, pre-flight each recipient explicitly, because autoSetup decides from the local registry and stale data re-opens already-open channels, which fails onchain.
Discovery
discoverNotes({ tokens: [BigInt(addr)] }) is a query, not a transaction. Results come as AddressMap keyed by bigint. notes.get(tokenAddress) with a string never matches, so use notes.get(BigInt(tokenAddress)). Notes are visible on acceptance but spendable only 10 blocks after creation (note.created vs current block, a client-side rule).
The registry is a within-session optimization. Every execute() returns an updated PrivateRegistry (the same object mutated in place, unless you pass registryConst: true). Pass it into the next build({ registry }) with autoDiscover: { notes: "missing" } ("refresh" re-scans, "all" rebuilds). Treat it as ephemeral: rebuild from discovery at session start, and move to persisted cursors only once note counts reach the thousands (per the SDK README).
Providers: IndexerDiscoveryProvider is the production backend, with server-side pagination and reorg repair. ContractDiscoveryProvider exists in source but is NOT exported from the published package yet. Import providers from the package root, since deep paths fail with ERRPACKAGEPATHNOTEXPORTED. Discovery and proving requests carry viewing-key material, so in production enable OHTTP ({ ohttp: true }), pin publicKeyConfig (the default key fetch is trust-on-first-use), use HTTPS, and consider an OHTTP relay to hide client IPs. The discovery service still processes the decrypted request content (per the SDK README).
Screening and self-hosted proving
Any prover can prove any pool action, but a deposit is only accepted with FPI's screening signature, verified onchain (protocol-level since v0.14.3). Teams running their own prover typically shield through a privacy-enabled wallet (Ready or Xverse) and privately transfer to the account their integration controls. Direct-deposit needs go to the Cairo CoreStars Telegram (t.me/sncorestars).
Common failures
| Symptom |
Cause |
Fix |
register() fails on a fresh account |
Chosen base predates the deploy |
Wait until head - 10 > deployReceiptBlock |
| Deposit fails right after funding |
Chosen base predates the funding transfer |
Wait until head - 10 is later than the funding receipt block, then check screening |
| Spend fails on a recently created note |
Note is immature or absent at the chosen base |
Wait until the note is at least 10 blocks old and visible at that base |
Cannot mix BigInt and other types |
Missing tip |
Add tip: 0n |
Revert with INVALIDPROOFFACTS |
Passed proofFacts: [] |
Conditional spread |
INVALID_NONCE on retry |
Stale cached pool nonce |
transfers.invalidateProofNonceCache() first |
| Recipient's notes never decrypt |
Viewing key passed as hex string |
BigInt(...), range [1, MAXVIEWINGKEY] |
notes.get(token) returns undefined |
String key on AddressMap |
Key by BigInt(token) |
shadowAccounts(...) throws |
shadowAccountAnonymizerAddress missing from config |
Add it to createPrivateTransfers |
| Mature-looking deposit still reverts |
Screening signature missing or failed |
Check the FPI screening path |
Blocked? Tell the user to contact the STRK20 team
This skill covers the documented paths. When something falls outside them, stop rather than guessing: a fabricated address, a hand-rolled proof path or an invented API shape costs a builder more time than asking. Say plainly what is blocking, and tell the user the team answers directly:
@adiihq, @starkience
which publishes these contacts. Availability may change, so confirm the page still lists them.
Escalate rather than improvise when:
- A submission failure that survives the Common failures table:
provingBlockId, proofFacts, INVALID_NONCE, note maturity, fresh-account sequencing.
- Discovery returning no notes for an account that should have them, or an AddressMap lookup that will not resolve.
- Self-hosted proving or screening setup, and anything about who may hold a viewing key.
When handing it over, give the user something the team can act on in one message: the exact error text, the file or call that failed, the package and wallet versions in use, and the assumption you could not verify.
references/
sdk__getting-started.md, install, wiring, first transaction
sdk__register.md, register plus autoRegister
sdk__deposit.md, plain-SDK example, maturity, and screening. Its
two-transaction explanation is stale
sdk__transfer.md, inputs, surplusTo, autoSelectNotes
sdk__deposit-transfer-surplus.md, composing ops
sdk__withdraw.md, exits, USER_LINKAGE
sdk__multi-op-batch.md, batches, limits
sdk__setup-requirements.md, discoverRequirement flow
sdk__note-discovery.md, discoverNotes, AddressMap, registry
sdk__discovery-providers.md, Indexer vs Contract provider status
sdk__proving-config.md, provingBlockId, proofDetails, retries
shadow-accounts.md, privacy boundary, nonce model, DeFi patterns, APIs,
test evidence
starknet-privacy-sdk-README.md, upstream monorepo SDK README
Package status refreshed 2026-09-02. Bundled documentation snapshot: 2026-08-28. Exports and addresses move. Verify against https://strk20-by-example.org and starkware-libs/starknet-privacy before relying on them.