Use when testing advanced browser-side and HTTP-layer attacks beyond basic XSS/CSRF — DOM XSS, CSP bypass, CORS misconfiguration exploitation, postMessage abuse, prototype pollution, DOM clobbering, clickjacking, web cache poisoning, and HTTP request smuggling.
Use when testing advanced browser-side and HTTP-layer attacks beyond basic XSS/CSRF — DOM XSS, CSP bypass, CORS misconfiguration exploitation, postMessage abuse, prototype pollution, DOM clobbering, clickjacking, web cache poisoning, and HTTP request smuggling.
On apps you own or are authorized to test.
Similar popular skills
Related neighbors and high-traction skills in the same topics — useful to compare before installing.
Declared targets from SKILL.md / docs. Unmarked agents are not listed — the skill may still install via the CLI.
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Repository health
Stars45
LicenseLICENSE
Default branchmaster
Open issues0
Status
Active
Package contents
Files included with this skill beyond the listing page.
skill mdSKILL.md3,701 B
docsSUMMARY.md338 B
History
First seen on skills.sh
First recorded snapshot · 35 installs
SKILL.md
Client-Side Exploitation (FIND/EXPLOIT — the browser & HTTP layer)
Overview
The presentation layer fails in ways scanners miss: client-side code, browser quirks, and the HTTP plumbing between the user and the server. This skill covers the advanced classes beyond the XSS/CSRF basics in security-code-audit/references/web-frontend.md.
Core principle: The browser executes whatever the page tells it to, and proxies/caches trust whatever parses cleanly. Attack the client's trust and the channel's assumptions.
Applies when / Skip when
Applies when: the app serves a browser-rendered UI or ships client-side JavaScript.
Skip when: API-only, CLI, daemon, or backend service with no browser surface → N/A.
If N/A: report "client-side-exploitation: N/A — no frontend surface" and stop. This is the
canonical "skill doesn't match the app" case — skip cleanly, never force-fit browser tests.
⚠️ Authorization
Your own/authorized app. Request smuggling and cache poisoning can affect other users of a shared cache/proxy — test only on isolated staging you control.
Per finding: source→sink (for DOM/PP) or the desync/cache mechanics, the PoC, and who's affected (self vs other users — the latter raises severity sharply).
Hand-off
DOM XSS → often a foothold in vulnerability-chaining; reproduce via active-pentest; fix via security-hardening (encoding, strict CSP, exact-origin CORS, Object.freeze/null-proto, front/back server normalization).
Common mistakes
Stopping at reflected/stored XSS — DOM XSS lives entirely in client JS and needs source→sink tracing.
Reading CORS as "only is bad" — credentialed origin reflection* is the real flaw.
Skipping request smuggling because it's "hard" — it's the highest-impact client-layer bug.
Testing cache poisoning/smuggling on shared infra — you can hit real users; isolate first.