majiayu000/spellbook

security-threat-model

Threat-model product features, APIs, data flows, secrets, permissions, supply-chain changes, auth boundaries, and risky code paths before or during implementation.

First seen Jul 2, 2026

Installation

$ npx skills add majiayu000/spellbook --skill security-threat-model

Summary

  • Threat-model product features, APIs, data flows, secrets, permissions, supply-chain changes, auth boundaries, and risky code paths before or during implementation.
  • Use when touching authentication, authorization, payments, secrets, user data, uploads, webhooks, admin tools, innerHTML/eval/exec, dependency upgrades, or cross-tenant access.

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More details

Agent compatibility

Declared targets from SKILL.md / docs. Unmarked agents are not listed — the skill may still install via the CLI.

Claude Code Not declared
Cursor Not declared
Codex Not declared
GitHub Copilot Not declared
Windsurf Not declared
Gemini CLI Not declared
Cline Not declared
OpenCode Not declared

Repository health

Stars 276
License LICENSE
Default branch main
Open issues 0
Status Active

Package contents

Files included with this skill beyond the listing page.

  • skill md SKILL.md 2,242 B
  • docs SUMMARY.md 369 B

History

  1. First seen on skills.sh
  2. First recorded snapshot · 9 installs

SKILL.md

Security Threat Model

Purpose

Use this skill before implementing or approving security-sensitive changes. It complements auth-security and server-security by mapping assets, attackers, trust boundaries, and concrete controls.

Scope First

Identify:

  1. Assets: credentials, tokens, user data, tenant data, money movement, admin actions.
  2. Actors: anonymous user, authenticated user, tenant admin, internal operator, compromised dependency.
  3. Trust boundaries: browser/server, service/service, tenant/tenant, CI/runtime, third-party callbacks.
  4. Entry points: API routes, CLI commands, jobs, webhooks, uploads, config files.
  5. Existing controls: validation, authz, rate limits, audit logs, secret storage.

Threat Checklist

Check at least:

  • Spoofing: can an identity, tenant, callback, or service be forged?
  • Tampering: can payloads, configs, migrations, artifacts, or logs be altered?
  • Repudiation: is there an audit trail for sensitive actions?
  • Information disclosure: can secrets, PII, logs, or tenant data leak?
  • Denial of service: can expensive paths be amplified?
  • Elevation of privilege: can user or service permissions expand?
  • Supply chain: can dependencies, scripts, CI, or generated files introduce risk?

Required Controls

Every finding needs one of:

  • preventive control in production code,
  • detective control with alerting,
  • compensating manual control with owner and expiry,
  • explicit accepted risk with rationale.

Do not accept "warn and continue" for authz, secrets, tenant isolation, injection, or payment/security-critical failures.

Output Shape

scope:
assets:
trust_boundaries:
entry_points:
threats:
required_controls:
tests_or_probes:
residual_risks:
review_gate:

For implementation work, include exact files and verification commands that prove the controls are active.