khendzel/skills-janitor

janitor-security

Heuristic security scan of installed skills — prompt-injection phrases, hidden unicode instructions, credential-store access, network-pipe-to-shell and payload-smuggling patterns.

First seen Jul 19, 2026

Installation

$ npx skills add khendzel/skills-janitor --skill janitor-security

Summary

  • Heuristic security scan of installed skills — prompt-injection phrases, hidden unicode instructions, credential-store access, network-pipe-to-shell and payload-smuggling patterns.
  • Use when the user asks 'are my skills safe', wants to scan skills for prompt injection or malware patterns, or before trusting a newly installed skill.
  • Trigger with '/janitor-security'.

Similar popular skills

Related neighbors and high-traction skills in the same topics — useful to compare before installing.

Also in this package

Other skills from khendzel/skills-janitor · top by installs.

npx skills add khendzel/skills-janitor

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More details

Agent compatibility

Declared targets from SKILL.md / docs. Unmarked agents are not listed — the skill may still install via the CLI.

Claude Code Declared
Cursor Not declared
Codex Declared
GitHub Copilot Not declared
Windsurf Not declared
Gemini CLI Not declared
Cline Not declared
OpenCode Not declared

Repository health

Stars 115
License LICENSE
Default branch main
Open issues 1
Status Active

Skill metadata

Parsed from SKILL.md frontmatter.

Version1.6.0
LicenseMIT
CompatibilityDesigned for Claude Code. Requires bash 3.2+ (macOS default works). Reads local skill files only; no network access.
Allowed toolsRead, Bash(bash:*)
Declared agents claude-code codex

Package contents

Files included with this skill beyond the listing page.

  • skill md SKILL.md 5,015 B
  • docs SUMMARY.md 391 B

History

  1. First seen on skills.sh
  2. First recorded snapshot · 15 installs

SKILL.md

Security Scan

Heuristic scan of skill content for prompt-injection and malicious patterns.

Overview

A skill is text your agent trusts: its SKILL.md is read as instructions and its scripts run on your machine. Public research (Snyk's ToxicSkills, 2026) found prompt injection in roughly a third of tested community skills. This scan flags the known bad shapes across every installed skill, in every scope (user, project, codex, plugin):

  • Injection phrases — "ignore all previous instructions", "do not tell the user"
  • Hidden instructions — imperative text in HTML comments (invisible when rendered), zero-width/bidi unicode between plain characters
  • Payload smuggling — large decodable base64 blobs in markdown
  • Dangerous scripts — network piped into a shell (curl … | bash), decode-and-execute, credential-store access (~/.ssh, ~/.aws, keychain), URL shorteners, plain-HTTP calls, uploads of variable data

Findings are heuristics, not proof: a RISK verdict means "read this before trusting it". Legit tools trip these rules too (e.g. an installer that pipes curl into bash) — the point is that YOU see it and decide.

Prerequisites

  • Claude Code with the skills-janitor plugin installed (provides scripts/security.sh)
  • bash 3.2+ (the stock macOS bash works; no external dependencies, no network access)

Instructions

Step 1: Run the scan

bash ~/.claude/skills/skills-janitor/scripts/security.sh           # all installed skills
bash ~/.claude/skills/skills-janitor/scripts/security.sh --json    # machine-readable
bash ~/.claude/skills/skills-janitor/scripts/security.sh --path ~/some/skill-dir   # one directory

Step 2: Present verdicts honestly

Per-skill verdict: RISK (any HIGH finding), REVIEW (any MEDIUM), PASS. For each flagged skill show the finding titles, the file, and the evidence snippet. Do NOT call a finding "malware" — describe what the pattern does and let the user judge intent (e.g. "media-use pipes a HeyGen installer from the network into bash — a common install pattern, but verify the URL before trusting it").

Step 3: Recommend next steps

  • RISK on a skill the user doesn't recognize or need → /janitor-swipe or delete it outright
  • RISK on a known/trusted tool → read the flagged file once, then move on
  • Before installing something new → /janitor-discover <url> runs this same scan pre-install

Output

Summary line (Scanned: N | RISK: x | REVIEW: y | PASS: z) followed by flagged skills, each with severity-tagged findings, the file, and an evidence snippet. --json emits the full structured report.

Error Handling

  1. Error: security.sh: No such file or directory

Solution: The plugin is installed under a different root — locate it with ls ~/.claude/skills or check the plugin cache.

  1. Error: Everything shows PASS but the user expected a finding

Solution: The scan covers markdown and script files up to 1MB, 200 files per skill; binaries and huge files are skipped. Check the specific file manually.

  1. Error: A trusted skill shows RISK

Solution: Expected for tools that legitimately use flagged patterns (installers, credential helpers). Read the evidence line — if it matches the tool's documented purpose, note it and move on. Verdicts are advisory; nothing is deleted.

Examples

Example 1: Full audit

Input: "Are my skills safe? Check for prompt injection."

Output: Run the scan, lead with the summary ("178 scanned, 2 RISK, 0 REVIEW"), then explain each flagged skill in plain language with its evidence, and close with a recommendation per skill.

Example 2: One suspicious folder

Input: "Scan ~/Downloads/cool-skill before I install it."

Output: Run with --path ~/Downloads/cool-skill and present the verdict; suggest /janitor-discover for the overlap check too.

Resources

  • Scan engine (plugin-relative): {baseDir}/../../scripts/security.sh
  • /janitor-discover <url> — pre-install check (overlap + this security scan on the fetched SKILL.md)
  • /janitor-report — general health check (errors, duplicates, broken skills)
  • /janitor-swipe — delete what you don't trust