igmarin/rails-agent-skills

security-check

Use when auditing a Rails app for XSS, CSRF, SQLi, IDOR, secrets, or auth bypass. Never print secrets. Trigger words: security, audit, XSS, CSRF, SQL injection, vulnerability.

First seen Jul 15, 2026

Installation

$ npx skills add igmarin/rails-agent-skills --skill security-check

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More details

Agent compatibility

Declared targets from SKILL.md / docs. Unmarked agents are not listed — the skill may still install via the CLI.

Claude Code Not declared
Cursor Not declared
Codex Not declared
GitHub Copilot Not declared
Windsurf Not declared
Gemini CLI Not declared
Cline Not declared
OpenCode Not declared

Repository health

Stars 24
License LICENSE
Default branch main
Open issues 0
Status Active

Skill metadata

Parsed from SKILL.md frontmatter.

Version1.0.0
LicenseMIT
More metadata
version
1.0.0
user-invocable
true

Package contents

Files included with this skill beyond the listing page.

  • skill md SKILL.md 5,957 B
  • docs SUMMARY.md 197 B

History

  1. First seen on skills.sh
  2. First recorded snapshot · 24 installs

SKILL.md

Security Check

HARD-GATE: Credential Handling

CREDENTIAL HANDLING (W007 — Insecure Credential Exposure Defense):
- NEVER reproduce credentials, tokens, API keys, passwords, or secrets verbatim
  in output — flag by file path and line number only.
- When a finding involves secrets in code or logs, report:
    Affected file: app/config/initializers/foo.rb:12
    Finding: API key present in plain text — move to Rails credentials or ENV
  Do NOT quote the secret value itself.
- Exploitability Verification sub-sections MUST use generic placeholder values
  (e.g. "<REDACTED>", "<TOKEN>") — never the actual credential.
- If a file scan returns a secret value, stop — report its location, not its content.

Quick Reference

Area Key Checks
Auth Permissions on every sensitive action
Params No permit!, allowlist only safe attributes
Queries Parameterized — no string interpolation in SQL
Redirects Constrained to relative paths or allowlist
Output No html_safe/raw on user content
Secrets Encrypted credentials, never in code or logs
Files Validate filename, content type, destination

Core Process

Core principle: Prioritize exploitable issues over style. Treat all untrusted input as potentially abused.

0. Inspect the Workspace

Before writing any findings or analysis, you MUST run search and directory listing tools to find source files in the workspace (e.g. controllers, models, config files). Perform a code-level security review on the actual files found. Only if the workspace is completely empty may you return a checklist and state that no source files were provided.

Review Order

Review in this sequence, and produce output sections in this same order:

  1. Authentication and authorization boundaries.
  2. Parameter handling and sensitive attribute assignment.
  3. Redirects, rendering, and output encoding.
  4. File handling, network calls, and background job inputs.
  5. Secrets, logging, and operational exposure.
  6. Verify each finding: Confirm it is exploitable with a concrete attack scenario before reporting. Exclude false positives (e.g., html_safe on a developer-defined constant, not user input).

Validation gate: The first output section must always be "Authentication & Authorization". If no auth/authz issue exists, open with "Authentication & Authorization: no issues found" before any other category.

Severity Levels

High

  • Missing/bypassable authorization — unprotected sensitive actions
  • Injection — SQL, shell, YAML, or constantization via user input
  • Unsafe redirects / SSRF — outbound requests or redirects driven by user-controlled values
  • Blind file upload trust — filename, content type, or destination unvalidated
  • Secrets in code/logs — tokens or credentials committed or printed

Medium

  • Weak parameter filteringpermit! or unscoped mass assignment
  • Unsanitized HTML output — user-controlled content rendered without sanitization
  • Plaintext sensitive logging — PII or credentials in log statements
  • Hidden security behavior — auth logic buried in callbacks or jobs without guardrails
  • Brittle custom auth — reimplements what framework primitives provide safely

Examples

High-severity (unscoped redirect):

# Bad: user-controlled redirect — open redirect / phishing risk
redirect_to params[:return_to]

# Good: relative path only
redirect_to root_path
# Good: allowlist
SAFE_PATHS = %w[/dashboard /settings].freeze
redirect_to(SAFE_PATHS.include?(params[:return_to]) ? params[:return_to] : root_path)

Medium-severity (mass assignment):

# Bad: privilege escalation risk
params.require(:user).permit!

# Good: explicit allowlist — never include role, admin, or privilege fields
params.require(:user).permit(:name, :email)

Output Style

When asked to perform a security audit, your output MUST include:

  1. Section order — One section per review area in the exact sequence specified; write "No issues found" for empty sections and note what evidence would be needed to verify that category
  2. Finding details — Each finding carries:

- Severity: High or Medium (not "Critical") - Attack path: input → reach → impact - Affected file: path + line, e.g. app/controllers/documents_controller.rb:42 - Mitigation: smallest credible fix - Hypothetical Exploitability Verification sub-section: concrete example vulnerability and exploit request/payload proving exploitability. This sub-section belongs inside Verification Steps & Quality Gates, never as a top-level section.

  1. No Implied Paths — When no source code is analyzed, use generic placeholders like SRCDIR/ or HYPOTHETICALDIR/hypothetical_controller.rb
  2. Language — Must be in English unless explicitly requested otherwise

Extended Resources (Progressive Disclosure)

Load these files only when their specific content is needed:

  • [PITFALLS.md](PITFALLS.md) — Use when you need detailed examples of common security pitfalls and false positives to avoid

Integration

Skill When to chain
code-review For full code review including non-security concerns
review-architecture When security issues stem from architectural problems
review-migration When reviewing migration security (data exposure, constraints)
security-review-process (from ruby-core-skills) Process discipline: OWASP checklist, Ruby-level security concerns